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A review essay for Historical Materialism on 
Milonakis, Dimitris and Fine, Ben (2009) From Political Economy to 
Economics: Method, the Social and the Historical in the Evolution of 
Economic Theory (London and New York: Routledge) 
and 
Fine, Ben and Milonakis, Dimitris (2009) From Economics Imperialism to 
Freakonomics: The Shifting Boundaries Between Economics and 
Other Social Sciences (London and New York: Routledge). 
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ABSTRACT 
Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis claim to find the source of the decay in 
modern economics in the ‘marginal revolution’ of the 1870s. They argue 
that this development led to ‘methodological individualism’ and the 
detachment of economics from society and history. I contest their 
account of the marginal revolution and of the role of Alfred Marshall 
among others. They also fail to provide an adequate definition of 
methodological individualism. I suggest that neoclassical economics 
adopted a denuded concept of the social rather than removing these 
factors entirely. No such removal is possible in principle. It is also 
mistaken to depict neoclassical economics as the science of prices and 
the market. In truth, neoclassical economics fails to capture the true 
nature of markets. I sketch an alternative explanation of the sickness of 
modern economics, which focuses on institutional developments since 
the Second World War. 
 
 
These two books are not meant to be fun to read.1 They lay out in 
historical fashion the regress of economics in two hundred years from a 
rounded and inclusive science to ‘an arcane branch of mathematics’ that 
fails to deal ‘with real economic problems’ (Friedman 1999, p. 137). As 
Mark Blaug (1997, p. 3) similarly observed: ‘Modern economics is sick … 
                                                 
1 The author is very grateful to Wilfred Dolfsma for comments on an 
earlier version of this review essay. 
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Economists have converted the subject into a sort of social mathematics 
in which analytical rigour is everything and practical relevance is 
nothing.’ Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis explore where things went 
wrong. It is a depressing story, not simply because of its content but also 
(as the authors acknowledge) because it is likely to be ignored by 
mainstream economists. They are unlikely to be attracted by the non-
mathematical, social and historical issues that are thematic in these 
volumes. I share these grave concerns about our profession.  
These detailed and widely-researched volumes force us to confront 
these problems. Fine and Milonakis try to diagnose the sickness, and 
consider how the malady may be cured. As they put it: 
mainstream economics is increasingly subject to an esoteric and 
intellectually inextricable technicism that is absolutely intolerant of 
alternatives and only allows them to survive on its margins. Despite 
its considerable and long-standing methodological and theoretical 
fragilities, there is no sign that this situation is liable to change as a 
result of internally or externally generated critique. (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009, p. 165) 
Writing two weighty and detailed books of this seriousness and length is 
no small achievement. I congratulate the authors for using the history of 
ideas to illuminate the wrong turnings of the past and to identify the 
sources of current problems. Surely this demonstrates that the history of 
economic thought is not merely a dusty obsession with old texts: it can 
have a great deal of instructive relevance for today. Given the 
seriousness of the malady afflicting our discipline, I hope that these 
volumes get the attention they deserve. 
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I accepted the invitation to review these two volumes because I know 
that their authors and I share not only a concern with the present state of 
economics but also we are jointly preoccupied with the question of the 
boundaries of economics and the other social sciences. In that respect I 
found a great of interesting and valuable material in these two books. 
Hence I do not regret my decision. I also wish to thank them for their 
generous acknowledgement of one of my own books in this area 
(Hodgson 2001). 
It may thus appear ungracious of me to assume a critical tone. But 
despite many strong points I believe that much of the central line of 
reasoning is deficient or wrong. In the following section I outline what I 
understand to be the main features of their long argument. Subsequently 
I shall explain why I think that several key claims are flawed. At later 
stages I shall introduce alternative diagnoses and consider other 
possible remedies. 
1. The central claims 
The first volume (Milonakis and Fine 2009) is a critical history of 
economic thought from Adam Smith to the postwar ‘formalist revolution’ 
in economics. They consider the contracting boundaries of economics as 
a discipline and how it has changed internally. They revere much of both 
classical and Marxian political economy and argue that adverse 
symptoms in the discipline can be traced back to the subsequent 
‘marginalist revolution’ of the 1870s. The second volume (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009) expands this claim by arguing that many adverse 
developments in economics during the twentieth century can be traced 
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back to that fateful decade of marginalism’s triumph. Our authors claim 
that: 
The marginalist revolution had taken the social and the historical out 
of the economy in a dual sense, by resorting to methodological 
individualism and by detaching the market/economy from society. 
(Fine and Milonakis 2009, p. 8) 
And similarly: 
the marginalist revolution had the effect of taking the social (and 
historical) out of economics both by focusing on the (asocial) 
individual and limiting itself to the science of the market. (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009, p. 12) 
There are a number of claimed consequences here. Several other 
passages in these volumes testify to these. According to these authors, 
the ‘marginalist revolution’ supposedly and eventually led to:2 
(a) the adoption of methodological individualism, 
(b) the depiction of the individual as a rational, utility-maximiser, 
(c)  the depiction of the individual as ‘asocial’ and the removal of the 
‘social’ from economics, 
(d) the removal of the historical dimension from economics, 
(e) increasingly deductivist and ahistorical approaches to theory, and 
                                                 
2 The seven propositions (a) – (g) below are claims that I extracted from 
the two volumes under review. See for example Milonakis and Fine 
(2009, pp. 2, 6, 11-12, 15, 26, 93, 218, 249) and Fine and Milonakis 
(2009, pp. 8, 12, 17, 22, 31, 131).  
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(f)  a narrower redefinition of economics as the science of prices and 
the market. 
Especially in the light of claims (c) and (f), how do our authors deal with 
Lionel Robbins’s (1932) apparently different redefinition of economics as 
the ‘science of choice’ and Gary Becker’s (1976, 1981) wider application 
of neoclassical economic analysis to non-market and ‘social’ phenomena 
such as the family? Do these moves undermine the claim of Fine and 
Milonakis that economics has become defined as the science of markets, 
and has abandoned the social? Fine and Milonakis (2009, pp. 8-9) 
answer that in practice these later moves amounted to the treatment of 
‘social’ phenomena as if they were like markets: 
the link between the economic and the social meant for Becker the 
application of the neoclassical technical economic apparatus to the 
social sphere and treating other areas of the social cosmos as if they 
were markets, rather than bringing the social back into economic 
theorising on any other terms. 
This suggests a further important claim made by the authors: 
(g) when marginalist economic analysis was later extended to ‘social’ 
phenomena it was obliged to treat them as if they were markets. 
Let me put my own view. Out of these seven claims, I am in qualified 
agreement with three. I am mostly in accord with (b), (d) and (e). 
Concerning (b) it is indisputable that the assumption of rational, utility 
maximising behaviour came to dominate economics during the twentieth 
century, although I would date its hegemony later than the 1870s. By the 
1970s, to challenge such an assumption was to make one virtually 
unemployable as an economist. 
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I am also broadly in accord with (d). I have argued (Hodgson 2001) that 
several developments including marginalism pushed economics in an 
overly-general direction, to the point of detachment with real but 
historically specific phenomena. But I do not believe that it was the 
outcome of marginalism alone. 
Concerning (e) there is not doubt that during the twentieth century the 
subject became much more axiomatic and deductivist. But there are 
challenges to the view that these trends persisted with full force beyond 
1990 (Colander 2005, Colander et al. 2004, Davis 2006). Notably these 
accounts are dismissed by Fine and Milonakis (2009, pp. 167-9). 
Regarding the other four claims ((a), (c), (f) and (g)), I believe that they 
are either too vague or wrong. My worries include the imprecise use of 
the terms ‘methodological individualism’, ‘social’, and ‘the market’, and 
the thesis that after the 1870s economics increasingly defined itself 
(explicitly or implicitly) in ‘market’ terms. 
Correct diagnosis is important because it can lead to effective 
remedies. In the next section I shall examine the seven claims in the 
context of the history of ideas. Did the ‘marginalist revolution’ lead to the 
outcomes as alleged? The two sections after that will criticise the flawed 
claims from an analytical point of view. We then move on to alternative 
diagnoses and remedies. 
2. The central claims in historical perspective 
Milonakis and Fine see the ‘marginalist revolution’ as the source of the 
woes of economics. Milonakis and Fine (2009, p. 118) wrongly claim that 
the German historical school were ‘in opposition to marginalism’. In fact 
they were among the earliest developers of marginalist doctrine, as 
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Alfred Marshall himself acknowledged. Influenced by earlier German 
thinkers, the founder of the historical school Wilhelm Roscher proposed 
a subjective theory of value in 1854 and Karl Knies – a member of the 
historical school who strongly influenced Marshall – put the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility at the core of the theory of price (Ekelund and 
Hebert 2002, pp. 200-1). 
Given such observations, researchers within the history of economic 
thought have moved away from the notion that there was a pronounced 
‘marginalist revolution’ in the 1870s. Careful historians of ideas have 
shown clearly that it was less of a sudden revolution than an intermittent 
process, traceable back to the writings of a variety of economists working 
as early as the 1830s (Howey 1960, Black et al. 1973, Ekelund and 
Hebert 2002). Furthermore, its impact was delayed. It was left to 
Marshall to tie the threads together. Prior to 1890, most of the published 
general histories of economic thought failed to mention the term 
‘marginal utility’. No written account of this supposed ‘marginalist 
revolution’ appeared until well into the twentieth century. No such 
dramatic revolution was noticed by economists who worked in the 1870s 
– it was more a matter of incremental change from the 1830s to the 
1890s and beyond. 
Partly because Marshall played a major role in the construction of 
marginalism, Fine and Milonakis are keen to depict him as a villain. 
Unfortunately there are several inaccuracies and misleading suggestions 
in their account. 
It is misleading to repeat that ‘Marshall’s main adversaries were to be 
found amongst the British Historical School’ (Milonakis and Fine 2009, p. 
118) or ‘his main protagonists were provided by the British Historical 
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School’ (p. 142) unless one also immediately makes it clear that among 
the historical school there were also some of Marshall’s closest and 
acknowledged allies. 
The authors do their best but fail to show that Marshall became a 
general antagonist of the historical school. They (p. 185) note that 
Marshall lauded the historical school only in the past tense in his 
inaugural lecture of 1885, implying that he no longer thought of them as 
worthy. This is a non sequitur. One can do no more than applaud 
contributions that exist in the past. And use of the past tense does not 
itself imply that any links are severed. Their claim that he also criticised 
the historical school’s ‘lack of theory’ are without any direct support from 
Marshall’s own texts. Any suggestion that Marshall’s praise for the 
historical school ended in 1885 is contradicted by repeated multiple 
acknowledgements of the methodological, theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the historical school in every edition of his Principles 
from 1890 until Marshall’s death (Hodgson 2005).  
Furthermore, Marshall had a major theoretical dispute with only one 
member of the historical school, namely William Cunningham, 
notwithstanding his policy differences with Herbert Foxwell and others 
over the policy of free trade. After reading Cunningham’s work, few 
would defend his vulgar empiricism that Marshall so ably demolishes. 
Cunningham was a Comtean positivist (at a time when such views were 
fashionable) who believed that theory emerged somehow from extensive 
fact-gathering. For Cunningham (1887, p. 8): political economy must ‘for 
the present be content to observe and classify and describe and name 
as other sciences have been’. Such crude atheoretical empiricism is 
methodologically indefensible. It understandably drew Marshall’s fire. 
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In their brief and unsatisfactory account of the Marshall-Cunningham 
debate, Marshall’s claim that Cunningham has misinterpreted his views 
is seen by our authors as an attempt to force his views on others and as 
‘the main substantive issue between the two’ (Milonakis and Fine 2009, 
p. 149). Marshall is acknowledged as being ‘generally conciliatory’ but 
‘firmly on the side of allowing for a separate, abstract theory’ (p. 152). 
This fails to get to grips with the issues under dispute. 
The truth is that Marshall did believe – like any sensible scientist – in 
the importance of ‘abstract theory’. But he repeatedly argued against its 
separation from facts, induction or history. In his Principles and 
elsewhere Marshall (1949, pp. 24, 32) argued that: ‘Induction and 
deduction are both needed for scientific thought as the left foot and the 
right foot are both needed for walking’ and ‘the economist must be 
greedy of facts; but the facts by themselves teach us nothing’. In his 
letters and elsewhere, Marshall repeated warned of the dangers not only 
of atheoretical empiricism, but also of treating theory as an end in itself 
(Whitaker 1996, vol. 2, pp. 256, 280, 393). 
In their attempt to convict Marshall as a major villain in their story, the 
Cambridge economist’s close and declared affinities with the historical 
school are mostly ignored (Hodgson 2005). And one piece of affirmative 
evidence in this regard is so shocking to the authors’ negative 
preconceptions of Marshall that it has to be presented with an 
exclamation mark (Milonakis and Fine 2009, p. 138). 
Contrary to what Milonakis and Fine (2009, p. 153) declare on the 
Methodenstreit, there is no substantive evidence that the ‘prevailing view 
at the time was that the abstract theorists had won the argument.’ 
Marshall’s continuing allegiance to Gustav Schmoller and other members 
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of the historical school is significant evidence to the contrary. As another 
case in point, far from acknowledging an Austrian victory in the 
Methodenstreit, Joseph Schumpeter (1908, pp. 6-7) wrote ‘both sides 
are mostly right … their sole difference lies in their interests in different 
problems.’ Schumpeter then went on to argue for the coexistence of an 
ahistorical, universal and Walrasian ‘pure economics’, alongside the 
more empirical ‘economic history’ and ‘economic sociology’. 
The authors’ account of American institutionalism is more balanced 
than that of Marshall. But they give insufficient credit to Wesley Mitchell’s 
theoretical contribution on business cycles. Inappropriately they use the 
verdict of the hostile neoclassical critic Tjalling Koopmans to establish 
Mitchell’s empiricism (Milonakis and Fine 2009, p. 187). If we are 
compare Mitchell’s tempered empiricism with the atheoretical fact-
gathering of Cunningham, then there is a substantive difference, yet 
while Mitchell is criticised for his empiricist sins, Cunningham is 
misleadingly depicted as a heroic David against Marshall’s Goliath. 
Fine and Milonakis also fail to acknowledge that the American 
institutionalists saw a place in their economics for a version of 
Marshallian marginalism. For example, John Maurice Clark and Wesley 
Mitchell saw Marshallian price theory as necessary for some types of 
economic analysis, while they criticized some of the more extreme or 
‘unrealistic’ assumptions found in the neoclassical tradition, such as 
individual utility maximization, universal diminishing returns, static 
equilibrium, perfect competition or perfect information. Thorstein Veblen 
also rejected rational utility-maximisation. But when Veblen (1892, 1893, 
1905) analysed price levels he acknowledged the effects of supply and 
demand. As Mitchell (1969, vol. 2, p. 685) pointed out, ‘Veblen himself at 
times makes casual, implicit use of orthodox economic theory’. This 
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unacknowledged partial accommodation of Marshallian theory by the 
institutionalists might suggest that Marshallian marginalism is not as 
pernicious as Fine and Milonakis claim. 
In placing much of the blame on the so-called ‘marginalist revolution’ of 
the 1870s, relatively less weight is put on later adverse developments in 
economics, such as the strong drift to formalism from the 1950s. From 
significantly different perspectives, both Mark Blaug (1997) and Tony 
Lawson (1997) see formalism as the malady, rather than marginalism. I 
would have liked to such much more discussion of Blaug’s and Lawson’s 
arguments, as well as of the claims by David Colander (2005) and others 
that mainstream economics is beginning to abandon deductivism and 
‘rational economic man’ in favour of more empirically-grounded 
approaches. These issues are controversial and unresolved. Yet they 
are central to the project of understanding both the trajectory and the 
malady of contemporary mainstream economics. 
3. Some central claims dissected – methodological individualism 
and the social 
I shall now analyse claims (a) and (c). I start with our authors’ repeated 
declaration that one of the gravest negative developments in economics 
is the adoption of methodological individualism. They never provide a 
clear and satisfactory definition of this term. It receives it first significant 
discussion on page 14, where they quote familiar definitions by John 
Watkins and Jon Elster. But the authors acknowledge neither the 
ambiguities in these quoted definitions, nor the hugely varied uses of the 
term by its exponents. They thus resume a well-defined target, whereas 
in reality there are multiple usages of the term. Sometimes, for example, 
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‘methodological individualism’ is wrongly treated in the literature as an 
ontological statement, e.g. ‘society consists of individuals’. Furthermore, 
Schumpeter’s (1907) original definition of the term profoundly contrasts 
with typical uses today (Hodgson 2007). 
I argue elsewhere (Hodgson 2007) that a crucial ambiguity in several 
definitions (including those provided by Elster and Watkins), is whether 
methodological individualism means that all social phenomena should be 
explained (i) in terms of individuals alone, or (ii) in terms of individuals 
plus interactive relations between individuals. I further argue that (i) is 
impossible in practice and no social phenomenon has been explained in 
terms of individuals alone. By contrast, in my view there is nothing wrong 
with the content of (ii), but it amounts to bringing social structures 
alongside individuals into the explanation, and thus does not warrant the 
description of methodological individualism. 
Fine and Milonakis are aware of my 2007 article on methodological 
individualism and they cite it without criticism. Fine and Milonakis (2009, 
p. 21) also cite Kenneth Arrow’s (1994) important ‘rejection of 
methodological individualism within economics on the grounds that it 
cannot be realised in practice.’ According to Milonakis and Fine (2009, p. 
328), Hodgson (2007) ‘has questioned whether a pure form of 
methodological individualism is to be found in practice, let alone that it is 
possible giving the necessity of taking something social as given in the 
first instance’. Yet if my argument is right, then ‘something social’ is 
never actually excluded, even from the most blinkered or formal of 
economic analysis. Arrow (1994) reaches a similar conclusion. 
To put it straightforwardly, is post-1870s economics infused by 
‘methodological individualism’ or is it not? Our authors repeatedly 
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suggest that it is.3 But they also seem to concede the arguments of 
Arrow (1994) and myself that ‘methodological individualism’ is never 
found in ‘a pure form … in practice’ because of ‘the necessity of taking 
something social as given in the first instance’. By citing Arrow and 
myself (significantly without any criticism or rebuttal), our authors seem 
to accept that the ‘pure’ form of methodological individualism (invoking 
explanations in terms of individuals alone) is impossible. 
This is such a major concession that it would imply that adequate 
explanations of social phenomena must always and unavoidably be in 
terms of both individuals and ‘something social’. This would be such an 
impure version of methodological individualism that it would be unworthy 
of the name (Hodgson 2007). 
So in their repeated statements that post-marginalist economics is 
driven by methodological individualism do they mean the ‘pure’ or the 
‘impure’ form? An enormous amount hinges on this question. Yet there is 
a dreadful lack of clarity on this issue. 
A further consequence of their apparent concession to Arrow (1994) 
and myself (that explanations are never in terms of individuals alone and 
must involve ‘something social’) is to undermine another central claim of 
the two works under review – that economics has allegedly narrowed 
itself to the point of excluding ‘social’ factors.  
                                                 
3 See Milonakis and Fine (2009, pp. 5, 13-14, 45, 102-7, 110, 194, 199, 
202, 213, 239, 246-7, 251, 258, 260-1, 264, 268, 271, 294, 301, 310) 
and Fine and Milonakis (2009, pp. 8, 10, 24, 26, 31, 44, 58, 63, 67, 79, 
81, 96, 107, 120, 127, 134, 143, 145, 147). 
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Fine and Milonakis never clearly define what they mean by ‘social’. But 
I assume this includes all forms of causally interactive relations between 
individuals, namely social structures, institutions, organisations, 
positions, conventions and so on; plus emergent properties of these 
interactive relations, such as social culture; plus groupings of individuals, 
such as social classes. 
Clearly, in its treatment of such ‘social’ phenomena, modern 
mainstream economics is gravely impoverished. But this does not mean 
that social factors are (or can be) entirely excluded. In their concessions 
to Arrow and me our authors seem to accept this. Social or institutional 
factors may be covert but they are never absent from mainstream 
analysis. One of the most persistent themes in both historical school and 
original institutionalist writings is to show that property, markets, prices 
and other factors – which are central to neoclassical economics – 
themselves require specific institutional and cultural foundations. One 
has only to dip into the works of Gustav Schmoller, Werner Sombart, 
Max Weber, or John Commons to find such arguments. More recently, 
Jan Kregel (1998) has shown that the general equilibrium model of Léon 
Walras assumed quite specific institutional foundations. And social 
structures are central to modern game theory, even if they are not 
described as such. These accounts do not point to the absence of such 
factors, but to their covertness and implicitness. 
One is left wondering precisely what the reintroduction of the ‘social’ 
into economics might mean. In some disfigured and inadequate form, 
isn’t it there already? 
Hence the claim that the ‘marginalist revolution’ led to ‘detaching the 
market/economy from society’ (Fine and Milonakis 2009, p. 8) cannot be 
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taken literally (even if we make the necessary correction of inserting ‘in 
theory’ after ‘detaching’). It is one thing to say that marginalists tried to 
sever such a link, quite another to say that they succeeded in analysing 
markets apart from social phenomena. In fact, neither is true. Although 
several early marginalists saw the economy and markets as facets or 
sectors of society as a whole, there is no evidence that they tried to rid 
analysis of the economy or markets of structured interactions between 
individuals. In the case of Walras, but less so for Marshall, markets and 
exchange were conceived in an overly abstract form. But ‘social’ 
elements remained in all these accounts. The economy was generally 
seen as part of society, not as apart from it. In any case, to separate the 
two would be theoretically impossible. 
Consequently the severe problem in modern economics to which Fine 
and Milonakis allude (but do not clearly identify) is not the exclusion of 
the social, but the highly impoverished manner by which relational, 
structural, institutional, organisational and indeed moral factors are 
treated throughout most discourse in the discipline. ‘Social’ factors are 
always there in some form, but the individual building blocks are 
celebrated and adorned, rather than the humble but vital cement that 
helps to hold them together. 
As a result, claims (a) and (c) are at best misleading and at worst 
invalid.  
4. More central claims dissected – markets and neoclassical 
economics 
I now turn to claims (f) and (g), which allege that economics after the 
‘marginalist revolution’ became defined more narrowly as ‘the science of 
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the market economy’ (Fine and Milonakis 2009, p. 22), and that the 
apparently contrary excursions of modern economists (such as Becker) 
onto ‘social’ terrain amount to treating ‘social’ phenomena as if they were 
markets. 
In the two volumes there is very little evidence to support these two 
claims. In fact, neither Walras, Menger, Jevons, Edgeworth, Marshall nor 
Robbins defined economics (or political economy) as ‘the science of the 
market economy’, or anything like that. 
Marshall, (1949, p. 1) for instance, defines economics as ‘the study of 
mankind in the ordinary business of life’. Economics ‘examines that part 
of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the 
attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.’ This 
conception includes industrial organisation, production and consumption, 
as well as exchange. Marshall’s writings were not confined to markets 
alone – they contain significant discussions of organisation, production 
and consumption. 
In part the problem here is that Fine and Milonakis offer no clear 
definitions of ‘the market’ or ‘the market economy’. So when we consider 
Walras’s (1874) universalisation of the concept of exchange so that it 
covers many forms of human interaction, even before the existence of 
legally sanctioned property rights, then is this the study of ‘the market 
economy’ or not? If Fine and Milonakis were to say that it was, then they 
would be culpable of universalising the concept of a market in a manner 
that they rightly criticise. But if they were to deny it, then they would have 
to acknowledge that Walras did not define economics as the study of the 
market economy. 
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It is even more absurd to claim that Robbins defined economics as ‘the 
science of the market economy’. Robbins’s actual definition of 
economics is very important because it was adopted by Paul Samuelson 
(1948) and became increasingly influential after the Second World War. 
It is well known that Robbins defined economics as ‘the science of 
choice’. Fine and Milonakis deal with this by arguing that what is really 
behind this definition is choice à la marché. They seem to suggest that 
when Robbins says that economics applies to all choice involving 
scarcity, in fact he means only choice on the market.  
This interpretation would not only be odd, but manifestly false, because 
Robbins actually rebuts such a definition. In the first chapter of his 
Essay, Robbins (1932) considers several different definitions of the 
discipline. He notes that the then most popular definition, common to 
Edwin Cannan, John Bates Clark, Alfred Marshall and Vilfredo Pareto, 
was that economics is ‘the study of the causes of material welfare’ (p. 4). 
Robbins (1932, p. 17) goes on to consider an alternative definition, which 
he attributes in part to Alfred Ammon (1927), that economics is 
concerned with ‘the behaviour implied by the institutions of the 
Individualist Exchange Economy’. Robbins responds by arguing that 
while economists have a central interest in the analysis of exchange 
economies, this is mainly because so many individual choices are 
involved. There is no reason, Robbins (1932, pp. 19-20) argues, why 
economics should be confined to the study of market economies. 
Fine and Milonakis propose that when neoclassical economists apply 
their theories to non-market phenomena – such as the family – they are 
essentially treating those phenomena as if they were markets. This is at 
best a half-truth. Neoclassical economics does not adequately identify 
the nature of market decisions and relations. It is wrong to suggest that 
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neoclassical economists have an adequate conception of markets and 
how they work. In fact, serious definitions and institutional analyses of 
the market are relatively rare, as Nobel Laureates George Stigler (1967, 
p. 291), Douglass North (1977, p. 710) and Ronald Coase (1988, p. 7) 
have all pointed out (Hodgson 2008a). Neither do Fine and Milonakis 
adequately explain the differences between individual decision-making 
and interaction inside and outside the market. 
Neoclassical economics is about consistent choices and their 
outcomes. It is not specifically about markets, at least in a rich, 
institutional sense. Adequate concepts of property, contract, exchange 
and market are absent from standard neoclassical theory. When 
attempts are made to discuss exchanges and markets in neoclassical 
economics then the main element of the narrative is the increases of 
utility received by the individuals involved, not the transfer of property 
rights within a framework of legal institutions. When institutions appear 
they are discussed primarily in terms of the incentives, information and 
constraints that they provide for utility-maximizing individuals.  
The fact that neoclassical economists frequently use the word ‘market’ 
does not mean that they are employing the concepts of property, 
exchange and market in an adequate or precise way. When Becker 
(1976, p. 206) wrote that ‘a market for marriages can be presumed to 
exist’, markets are little more than a means by which agents can transact 
in some vague manner, to increase their mutual utility. When he uses the 
word ‘market’ it has little institutional substance other than a zone of 
individual interaction. 
 Precisely because his concepts are so impoverished, Becker fails to 
make an adequate distinction between (a) sex traded intentionally for 
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money or commodities, and (b) sex based on mutual agreement or 
desire rather than pecuniary or commodity exchange. Yet modern 
cultural (and religious) norms make a very strong differentiation between 
these two types of sexual relationship. Because he deploys no adequate 
notion of property, commodity exchange or market, these differences are 
elided in Becker’s analysis of the family. By reducing all transactions to 
the mutual enhancement of ‘utility’, neoclassical theory is generally 
heedless to the moral, cultural and institutional distinctions that are 
involved. 
It is thus highly misleading to suggest that neoclassical analysis has 
some kind of grounding in real markets, and that it is a mistake of the 
economics imperialists is to treat other social phenomena as if they were 
markets. Neoclassical theory has at best a tenuous relation to real 
markets, and hence it is largely unable to treat any social phenomenon in 
market terms. 
Before we leave markets I wish to make a final point. Although we are 
familiar with the singular phrase ‘the market’, and it is difficult to avoid it 
entirely, it is highly misleading. Once we acknowledge that markets are 
institutions then it is clear that there is not one market form, but several 
(Hodgson 1988, 2008a, Mirowski 2007). It is a defect of both 
neoclassical and Marxist economics to treat the market as a singular 
entity, and to underestimate its differences in form. 
5. Diagnosing sickonomics 
Fine and Milonakis pin much of the blame on the so-called ‘marginalist 
revolution’. I agree in part that marginalism helped to entrench notions of 
utility-maximisation, which in turn aided mathematical formalism. But the 
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picture is more complicated because not all marginalists were wholly 
committed utilitarians. I also believe that the growth of marginalism and 
utilitarianism was much more gradual. 
The principal policy conclusion that seems to flow from Fine and 
Milonakis’ analysis is that the salvation of economics lies in reversing the 
‘marginalist revolution’. I doubt whether this is possible or desirable. The 
earlier classical and Marxist traditions are inadequate for our needs. 
Parts of marginalist analysis bring the benefit that they focus on 
incremental individual incentives, which are important matters both for 
theory and institutional design. I would prefer a strategy that placed 
Marshallian and other valuable insights within an institutional and 
historical context, as several American institutionalists attempted in the 
1920s and 1930s (Hodgson 2004). 
How did economics become sick? Fine and Milonakis’ diagnosis is 
concentrated too much on the influence of ideas, and neglects the 
manner in which unsatisfactory ideas are sustained and impelled by 
culture, institutions and vested interests. The battle of ideas is important, 
but in order to win, good generals also understand how people are 
guided and provisioned. 
I wish to sketch very briefly an alternative explanation of the sickness 
that afflicts economics. At the institutional and cultural level, the most 
important factor is the global change in the nature of the university. In 
developed countries before the Second World War, universities were 
reserved for a rich or intelligent minority. Despite pressures from 
business and religious institutions, they managed to dispense a relatively 
broad education and maintained an ethos for the pursuit of truth. This 
was eroded in most developed countries after the Second World War. 
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Especially since the 1960s, the university has become an institution 
much more oriented to specialist professional training under the behest 
of business corporations. 
Veblen (1918) observed some of the early stages of this evolution long 
ago. Others, from different analytical and ideological viewpoints 
(Callahan 1962, Bloom 1988, Lutz and Field 1998, Kirp 2003) have 
charted within universities the postwar decline of broad and questioning 
inquiry, and the rise of narrower forms of professional training. Students 
are less encouraged to pursue the big questions that haunt our 
existence. They are urged instead to acquire qualifications that signal 
skills that can be hired on the jobs market. Behind this process has been 
the dramatic postwar expansion of systems of higher education in 
developed capitalist economies, to meet the demands of growing 
knowledge intensity and relentless specialisation in the sphere of 
production (Pryor 1996). Deep specialisation means that Renaissance-
like figures with a capacity for an informed overview are both more 
difficult to create and even less likely to be acknowledged (Hodgson 
1999). 
The postwar university expansion had the important benefit of bringing 
higher learning to a much wider segment of the population. Yet it was 
impelled by perceived economic needs, and it accelerated the process of 
commercialisation within higher education. Crucially, expanded 
education systems require much more from the public purse, and 
democratic and other pressures on governments oblige them to account 
for the expenditures in performance terms. 
Together these forces eroded enclaves of broad liberal education, 
vastly expanded professional training oriented towards employment, led 
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to requirements to account for the economic value of university research, 
and promoted the increasing use of league tables and formalised 
research assessments to pressure academics to publish their research. 
These background institutional forces have impacted upon different 
disciplines in different ways. Partly as a result of the recruitment of 
economists into operations research and other applications during the 
Second World War (Bernstein 2001, Mirowski 2002, Hodgson 2004), 
economics suffered in a peculiar way because it had established a type 
and degree of formalism that allowed research output to be assessed 
unidimensionally in terms of mathematical interest and elegance, with 
less heed to its philosophical or conceptual underpinnings. Economists 
were judged and became employable for their aptitudes for statistical 
analysis or predictive models. 
Because they are no longer educated to take such issues seriously, 
mainstream economists no longer care about the deeper meanings or 
historical origins of theories or concepts, or about big questions 
concerning economic and social systems. Economists learn ‘tools’, but 
little of their ultimate purposes in the grand design. As long as academic 
economists publish in the higher-ranking economics journals dominated 
by mathematics, or land lucrative consultancy contracts, they reap their 
rewards and enhance their reputations. That is all that seems to matter. 
This process would be difficult or impossible to reverse, but undoing 
the marginal revolution would be no less tricky. What is necessary, at 
least for the near future, is for the technically unobsessed economists to 
establish networks and institutions in which broader modes of enquiry 
can be preserved. Much greater dialogue is required between economics 
and the other social sciences. Some reorganisation of the social 
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sciences in universities is also necessary to help achieve this goal. 
Indeed, there is no apparent justification for the divisions between 
economics and ‘economic sociology’, or indeed sociology as a whole 
(Hodgson 2008b). 
6. Concluding remarks 
These are interesting and important books but some of their key 
arguments are unconvincing. Several key concepts lack adequate 
definition, including ‘social’, ‘methodological individualism’ and 
‘reductionism’. The authors wish to show how political economy lost its 
soul to a narrow version of economics, bereft of ‘social’ or historical 
factors. But one never learns the precise meaning of the ‘social’, and in 
any case this general claim is highly contestable. 
As an alternative to vaguely-defined ‘methodological individualism’ the 
authors propose an equally imprecise ‘methodological structurism’ (Fine 
and Milonakis 2009, pp. 149, 153-9). This amounts to a mélange of the 
work of Anthony Giddens and a few others, with no acknowledgement of 
some important criticisms of Giddens’ work, and without a mention of 
other significant recent important social theorists such as Margaret 
Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, Jürgen Habermas 
and Niklas Luhmann. 
I could find nothing original in this history of economic thought. There is 
no striking use of new sources and no major reinterpretation of known 
material. The authors repeat some discredited misinterpretations, 
particularly concerning Marshall and the ‘marginal revolution’, which 
have been shown in the light of scholarship to be flawed. 
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For me, reading these volumes was a valuable experience. I wish them 
well on their voyage through academia. But I hope that the two ships are 
not spoiled for few a halfpennies of tar.4 
                                                 
4 On a minor point, the copyeditor of this first volume fails to correct a 
grammatically grotesque habit of adding in-text Harvard-style references 
after a comma at the end of a sentence (rather than placing them entirely 
within brackets like this), thus undermining the structural integrity of the 
sentence as a whole. The copyeditor of the second volume does a better 
job. 
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